Mansoura Engineering Journal
Volume 33

Issue 3

Article 6

12-5-2020

New Secret Key Exchange Based on Recent Cryptographic
Schemes.
Amina Rashad
Electronics, Communication and Computers Engineering., Faculty of Engineering at Helwan., Helwan
University, eng_amina82@yahoo.com

Maged Ibrahim
Assistant Professor., Electronics, Communication and Computers Engineering Department., Faculty of
Engineering at Helwan., Helwan University., mhii72@yahoo.com

Zaki Nossair
Assistant Professor., Electronics, Communication and Computers Engineering Department., Faculty of
Engineering at Helwan., Helwan University., mossalr@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://mej.researchcommons.org/home

Recommended Citation
Rashad, Amina; Ibrahim, Maged; and Nossair, Zaki (2020) "New Secret Key Exchange Based on Recent
Cryptographic Schemes.," Mansoura Engineering Journal: Vol. 33 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.21608/bfemu.2020.127484

This Original Study is brought to you for free and open access by Mansoura Engineering Journal. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Mansoura Engineering Journal by an authorized editor of Mansoura Engineering Journal.

Mansoura Engineering Journal, (MEl), Vol. 33, No. 3, Sep.ember 2008.

E. I

New Secret Key Exchange Based On Recent Cryptographic Schemes
~I ~I .JJb ~I';";""l;"*, ,;,;, .. II 0<; "yoJl c:U1.l1 J.>l;'
Amina Abd EI Fattab Rllshad
Dr :Magcd H. Ibrahim
Dr:Za ki B.Nossair
Department of Electronics, Communication!! and Computers engineedng,
Faculty of Engineering at Helwan,
Helwan University
E.mall: (ellK-amlna82@yahoo.com)(mhii72@yahoo.com)(mossalr@yahoo.com)

:~

u- <;i ,",-".,..II Cw..l' J>4' J.,s hJ'~
.01"'; ... 11 0-> ~I 0!-! Clli.ll J>l-" &--'-'" J.,s-"JJ' C'jill -'" u..J1 I;' u- ~IJ fol JI .

~10!-! 'V•..I1 .::,Yl...,,"jl ~ .WI Uk ......,..11 ....

".,..JI Clli.llill J-:;..., ?"; ... JS .,.,WI ~ ,,-'"' CUi. J,l+Y ~ JS J.,s":;Jyll I;' '"
~IJ JW J.,s.,:; yll III "I ~I III u-i WI.>.l J ..?'}II ~);,',,,.Ii t-' pi ,,-'"' CUi. J.>t#
15J

.J1C I

ii.II<"p1

.'IU'JJ

<jiJYu

II .. !

.;!I4~.J

'4

Abstract:
Authenticated key exchange protocols have an important role for building
secure communications amongst two or more entities over the networks. Twop'arty authenticated key exchange protocols where each pair of parties must
share a secret with each other; a three-pany protocol does not cause any key
management problem for the parties. In this paper, an extension of two-party
key exchange protocol, which is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. is
proposed. In this protocol each user exchanges secret key with server then each
user uses this secret key to exchange session key with each other. The
efficiency and the security analysis of this new key exchange protocol are
proven in this paper.

Keywords:
Two party, three party, authenticated key excl1ange, network security

Introduction:
Key establishment prolrcols
are mechanisms that allow any tWo
or more users to establish shared
keys amongst themselves. There are
two fundamental types of key
Key
establishment
protocols.
transport and key exchange. Key
transport protocols, are those in
which a single entity is tru sted to
choose th e key and securely lransfer
it to Ole other entities.

Key Exchange Protocols
Properties [I)
1) Links between key exchange
and mutual authentication
a) Key exchanges mus. be
authenticated
to
prevent
attacks.
b) A session key makes i.
possible to extend an initial
authentication to the whole
communication.
.c) "Authentication and
key
exchange protocols" provide
direct
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aUlhenlicated key exchange

exchange and the motivations and

all-in-one.

contributions.

The

model

2) Forward Secrecy (FS)
a) Even if an attacker discovers
long-term secretes), he will

assumptions are given in section 3.
Section 4 describes the proposed
protocol. Section 5 represents the

not be able 10 recover the
session keys (past and
future).

security
i.lllalysis.
Section
(,
represents Periom13nee discussions .
Finally, the conclusions are givcn in

b) Provided

when

long-term

secrets are only used for
authentication and do not

take part in session keys
generation.

3) Identity Protection
a) No identity is transmitted in :
the clear, so a spy can't know
who
the communicating

peers are.
There are many different ways to
analyze key exchange protocols:
I) ' Known key security: a protocol
run should result in a unique

secret session key. If this key is
compromised, it should have no
impact on other session keys.
2) Forward secrecy: The fact that
long-term private keys .are
compromised, should have no
impact on the secrecy of
previously established session ·
keys.

3) Key-compromise impersonation
resilience: If entity A's longterm
private
key
is
compromised , an adversary is
able to impersonate A. But this

should not enable him to
impersonate other entities to A.
4) Key control: Neither of the
entities should be able to force.
the session key to a value of his
choice.
Paper organizatioD, this paper is

organized as follows: Section 2
represents the previous work of key

section 7.

2. Previous work:
A key exchange pr%col is a
series of steps used by two or more
parties in order to securely agree on
a shared secret, such as a session
key, in an unprotected network. A.

protocol that establishes a shared
key between two entities is called a

two-party key exchange protocol.
Sometimes it's also useful to
consider three parties. and thus the
protocol is called a tripartite key

exchange protocol. I f a protocol has
more than three participants, it is
called a group or conference key
exchange protocol. These kinds of
protocols have a long history; the
first known protocol was DiffieHellman [2, 3, and 4]. In 1976.
Whitfield
Diffie
and
Martin
Hellman [5] proposed the earliest
example

of an

asymmetric

key

establishment technique, but this
protocol docs not provide any
authentication of parties or the
exchanged infonnatinJ1. the scheme
is vulnerable to a man-ill-the-middle
attack.. Since then. many key

exchange protocols have been
proposed. In 2004. Popesell [6J
proposed a protocol based on
elliptic curve but this protocol docs
not
meet
key-compromise
impersonation resilience. In 2005,

He Ge [7] proposed a protocol
based on hidden exponent RSA , bul
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this

protocol

does

not

meel

unknown key-share resiUence. In
2005, Fuw-Yi Yang and Jinn-Ke
Jan [8) proposed a protocol based
on Diffie-Hellman key exchange
called H-p rotocol. In 1992. A
.refinement
and
extension
of
encrypted key exchange scheme
.was proposed by Steiner et al. [9),
which was extended to three-party.
' In 2005. Anish Mathuria and Vipul
Jain [ 10) proposed some three party
key exchange protocols using
'trusted server, but one of thi s
protocols does not meet key
confinnation then he proposed new
protocol to solve th is problem. In
2006. Wen, Lin and Hwang [I I)
proposed a protocol based on hybrid
key architecture. A hybrid key
architecture means that one entity
(often a server) stores a pair of
matching public/private keys while
the other entity shares a secret with

E. 3

security of the proposed protocol

are proven in this paper.
3. The Model Assumptions:
In thi s section , we precisely
slale the assumptions of the
adversary and the communica ti on

models.
The Communi cation Model :
In this pro toco l. two parties,
Alice and Bob connect to a server
then Alice and Bob connect to each
other. The three parties will then be
connected

on

a

private

and

authenticated channel.
T he Adversary Model :
Assume a passive adversal)'.
which means thai this adversary can
sec and learn all infomlation sent to
or from the corrupted party wit hout
compromising the correct behavior

of this party. The parties follow the
execution steps of the protocol word
for word but they are wi lling 10

the server. This protocol does not

learn any information leaked during

meet forward secrecy. In 2006.
Brita Vesteras [12) improve the
of
Wen-Lin-Hwang's
security
protocol.

execution.

Thi s co mmon ly

used

security model is welJ·known as the
honest-but-curious scenario .

4. The proposed Protocol:
The

motivation:

Two-party
exchange

In th is section , the complete
descript ion of the pro posed protocol

protocols where each pair of parties
must share a secret with each other;

is given. Alice and Bob want to
agree on two session keys using

a three-party protocol does not

tru sted party (server). Alice and
Bob share secret key wi th server
then use this key to agree on two
session keys.

authenticated

key

cause any k,ey management problem
for the parties.
The

contribution : the proposed

protocol is an extension from

("\\'0

parties to three pa rties. In thi s
protocol each user exchange secret
key with server then uses this secret
key to exchange session key with
each other. T he efficiency and

Notations:
Descriptions for the nota tions used
in this protocol are as follows :
U"U. ,U, : The identi ty of A lice,
Bob and Server.
S"S,: master key that Alice &Bob
stores.
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pk"sk. : A public/private key pair

server then se lects two raT1dom
numbers
r , and k.. .
The Serve r

held by server
E".. (x): Encryption of x using the

computes

server's public key pk..,

(n~. =

D.. (x): Decryption of y using the

•

server's private key sk.\.

10, H() : One-way hash functions
From the beginning, Alice
(VA) and Bob (V ,) store their
master keys S, and S, . The server
V.
holds
the
private
key
pair pk,.sk . , and mai~tai ns a public
table which contains all identities
(like V" V,)
and
their
corresponding

verifiers

(like/(UA ,S, ),J(U"S,)).
The
table record for clients U, and
U,will be (V, ,J(V,,S,», (V"
I(U.,S,». Alice and Bob select .a
random numbers ro and ro then they
compute the cipher text from
Yo = E".~, <U,..,U H,SA,r,,)
andYb = Epj .• (U ... ,U,pSn,r,,). Then
they store (ro • y.) and (r, ,y,).
Alice and Bob select ko andk" then

=y."

modp) and

(n, ~y:' modp). Alice sendsy.,
n"and Bob sendsYb' n~ to the
server. The server decrypts y" to

obtain(U",U/j,S ..o ro )' The server
then checks if I(U"S,) matches
with the value in the table. Tne
Server
decrypts
y, to
obtain(V"U"S"r,). The server
then checks if I(V"S,) matches
with the value in the table. If there
is no match, the server tenninates
the protocol. If there is a match, the

-

-

-

---~-

---

=y:'

y/. mod p)
,.

modp)

then

and

computes

Sk" = H«I1,,) . . r".r,) and the scrVl;r

creates an authent ication value
A.th" = H(S(,,2) with Alice. The
server

The Protocol:

they compute (no

.

(n "

computes
Sk~ = H«n b ) ' ,I'" ,r,) and tllC server
create an authentication vaiue
Auth., = H(Sk;,2) with Bob. Server

.

,.

sends

r~. n .• . Aurh'd

10 Alice lind

r• . n •.. Aut"" to Bob . Alice and Bob

compute

.

Sko =

,.

H«n ,,l ", I;,,",) and

Sk; = H«n" )r, ,r"r,)

Alice and

Bob verify Auth.<. and AII/h,.lhen
create an authentication
A.tho = /-I(Sk o ,l)

value

and Auth, = /-I(Sk;,I). Alice and Bob
send Atlfh" and Al/fIJ,. to server.
Alice and Boh compute secret keys
Sko = H( Sk;,O) andSk, = /1(8k;,0).
Server verifies Alllh" anclAlJfh b . If it
is okay, the server computes the
secret
keys
Sko = H(S("O)

andSk, = H (Sk;, O). Alice encrypts
(V, , (n,)"

by secret key which
computed between Alice and server
and send it to the server. The server
decrypts this cipher and encrypts
(V,,(n,y, ) by secret key which
computed between Bob and server
and send it and n" to Bob. Bob
decrypts thi s message and comp utes
session key (K ,IH = (n .•• )*.A. mod fJ )

then sends (n" )r" MAC< ... (n,. )" to
Alice. Alice computes session key
(K"" = (n,_ )'\ .~. mod p) then sends
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MAC,,, (n,Y'

to

Bob.

Bob

and

computes

E. S

sessto n

key

encrypts(U A,(n.Y') by secret key

(K", ~ (n.Y'" mod p)

which computed between Bob and
the server and send it to the server.
The server d~crypls this cipher and
encrypts (UH .(n,,)" ) by secret key
which computed between Alice and
the server and send it and n,, to

(n,,)'-. MAC, .. (n,,)" to Bob. Bob

th en sends

computes
session
(K ... ~(n~) "'- mod,,) then

key
sends

MA CK •. (n.,)'- to Alice.

Alice. Alice decrypts th is message
. Alice (SA)
Select ' . .... {O,I}'
Compute Yo = EpIt$ (UA,UfJ .S/r ,I~)

Server

Select

r•

Bob (Su)
.... (O,I)'

Compute Yb ::: E,.,.., (U II'U H, SH. r,,)

Select k, .... (O.!)'

Select k • .... {O,I}'

Compute n" ::: y /o t. mod p

Compute nQ = y {/ t. mod p

•

•

D." (y,,)
C)teck on !CUA, SA)

D"., (y, )
Check on f(U,.S. )
Select r, .... {O.I}'
SelecI k, .... (O.!I '

Compute

y"t, mod J1

11 ,. :::

Compute n",.

Sk; ~ H« n.f

=

y~~' mod p

.~•.r,)

AUIIt,_ = H( Sk;.2)

.

Sk,

~

,

H«n,) .• 1, .,,)

AUlh,_ ~ II (Sk;.2)

•

r " I1.

,

-

, Au/h,

r" n".,Aulh .•

Sk; ~ H«n , j- ,r.,r,)

•
Sk; ~

. ,
H(Sk • •2)~ · Alllh,
.-

H«n,y
' .r,. r,)
.
,

H( Sk, .2)

AUlh. ~ H(Sk;.l )

~

Aulit

"

AUlh" = H(Sk~.1)

•

•

H(Sk;, I) ~1 Alilh.

AUlh"
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.

,

H (Sk. , I ) ~ ·

Sk. ~ H(Sk;.O)

Aulh,

Sk. ~ H(Sk;.O)
Sk, ~ H (Sk;.O)

Sk, ~ H (Sk;.O)

.>'·)

E •• (U,.(n •

•
D~. (E,.. (U , •(n .•, )••

»

E~.(U,.(n ,)'· )

•
D", (E.• • (U .•. (n,. ) •• )) .
KAII :::

(n, .. )'".... mod p

K AH ~ (y " t , )-.*. mod I'

•
K" ~ (n,Y'" mod p
K All

=

(y /. )-",). mod p

MA C, (n, )"
.'~

.

-----..::.....::...- - -- - - - - -+.

D.". (E". (V A'

E", (U, .(;,.,)")

(n.Y· » •

E.•• (V ,,(n.Y' )

•
D.~ . (E .... (V, ,(n .• )"»
K ... ;

(n.y'"

mod p

K ... ~ (y:' ) .... mod p

•
K

. .

MAC, ·(n, )"

•

.

= (II

'. )t••. modp
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5. Security analysis:

client's private keys s., in order to do
this. So the protocol meets the key

Known key security:
The session key K All' K 6A is
computed
from
(Yo" ) •••,

compromise impersonation goal.

and<r:' )•••• . All the values ofko '
k. and k, change each session. This
means that even jf the session key is
compromised, it will have no effect
on other session keys. So the
protocol meets the known key
security goal.

private keys do no directly affect
the session key. So if the attacker
wants to learn a previous session
key, he must drivek o ' k•. These
values transmit in discrete logarithm
problem. So the protocol meets
Forward secrecy goal .

Key-compromise impersonation
resilience:
Ifthe Alice's long-term private

Unknown key-share resilience :
Because of the Auth messages

key SA is compromised, an attacker
can impersonate Alice and create
the message Yo' This is because the
encryption algorithm, the server's
public key pk, and U, is publicly
known. All the attacker then needs
in order to create the message
y" = Ept_, (V 14 ,UJnSA,r,,) is a random ·
value fa', But because the attacker
does not know the server's secret
key sk" he is not able to decrypt the
value Yo and get the information he
needs in order to compute the hash

va IueSko·

= H«n,) •• ,,~, r,).

He

Forward secrecy:
In Ihis protocol, the long-term

that "the two parties exchange with
server, they prove their identity to

each other. As long as the server's
private key sks is not compromised.
only the server could decrypt Yo , y.
and get the r(J • r" which it needs to

. value that

..

create an Auth, , Aliths

the clients would accept. And still.
as long as sks is not compromised.

only the client wh0 sent the first
message will know the value of

r..

and create an AlI1ho that the server
would accept. So the protocol meets
the unknown key-share resilience
goal.

cannot get the correct value of r(J

without decrypting Yo .
Now look at it in the other way, and
assume that the server's private key
sk,'; is compromised. Then at:!
attacker can decrypt the message Y<l

•

y. from Alice and Bob. He can th en
complete the protocol and create a
secret key SK between Alice and
the attacker. But he still cannot
impersonate another client to the
server. He needs to know one of the

Key control:
The
K ~H = (J'd ' . ) ,·~t.

sessIOn

and K

~

keys
=

( y ~ ' . )~ ' ~ .

consist of three random values, one
from each entity. Alice and Boo
select ko ' kb . In the same time . Su,
each of Alice and Bob can not
control in their random values to
result session keys as they want. Su,
the protocol meets key control goal.
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6. Performance discussion:

Key confinnation:
Because both client and server

verify each other's Auth values,
they confirm that the other principal
is computing the same secret key.
Each party verify each other's MAC
values, they confirm that the other
principal is computing the same
session key. Hence the protocol
provides strong key confirmation.
The protocol's specific goal:
The goal of this protocol is to
extend the two-party key exchange
protocol into three-party key
exchange and to achieve Olutual

authentication

and

secure

communication. The two parties,.

Alice and Bob are authenticated by
sending their IDs (V"V.) and
master keys (SA'S H)' encrypted
with the server's public key pk.. in
Y.. = Epk., (UA,UH.S ,pl~)

andy'" =Epk.~ (U .... UII . SII,rh)'

The

server is authenticated by sending
back Auth,.~H (H «n,) "', ra, r,), 2)
and AUth'b~H (H «nb) ",rb, ,r.), 2).

Assume that the server's private key
sk, is kept secret, which it should
be, only the server could decrypt Yo •
YII and retrieve the value ro and rh ·
Because of the Auth messages,
Alice and server know that they are
using the same va!uesy... r" andy,_
Bob and server know that they are
using the same valu~s YA'

'II

In (his section. examine the

performance
protocol

of

lenns

In

perspectives:

the

proposed
of

communication

two
cost

and on-line l:llmpUlulion cost

I: Communication cost:
Comparisons
of
communication cost in tenns of
round efficiency and messagetransmitted size between the
proposed protocol and the related
schemes are given as follows:
A: Round efficiency: the proposed
protocol only requires three rounds.
which is less than it is required hy

other
round-ellicient
3PAKE
schemes (related to table I).
B:
Message-transmitted
size:
Assume that the block size in secure

secrete key cryptosystems is 128
bits, the output size in public key
cryptosystems is 1024 bits, the
output size of one-way
functions
is
128
bits.

hash
The

transmitted message size of the

proposed protocol is 128 • 4 + 1024
• 2 bits in Round I. The cost is 128
• 8 + 128 • 2 bits in Round 2. In
Round 3. ·the cost is 128 • 2 bits.
Therefore. the total size of
transmitted message in the proposed
protocol is 4096 bits. From table I,
the proposed protocol has less
message transmiltcd si:t.c than LSI-!

and SCH protocol.

and r, .

Therefore, the protocol achieves
mutual authentication and - secure

2: On-line computation cost:
From table I, the proposed

communication.

protocol required suitable modular
exponentiation
secret
key

protocol
model.

is

The

secure

proposed

in

standard

en(de)cryption
. en(de)cryption.
SCH protocol
en(de)cryption

and public
LSH protocol
required secret
and public

key
and
key
key

Mansoura Engineering Journal, (MEl), Vo\. 33, No.3, September 2008.
en(de)cryption more than required

E9

in the proposed protocnl.

Modular
efficient

Hu h

~il.C

3

proplncd prolO('1l1

The values of the random numbers
have no effect on computation cost.
The computation of hru;h functions
has very light cost. Public and

secrecy,
Unknown
key· share
resilience, Key control and Key
confinnation. Besides, compared
with other schemes. the protocol not

secret

only needs fewer rounds to perlonn

key

exponenti~tion

encryption
have
a

alld
large.

computational cost. From table I,
the proposed protocol involves the
fewest number of rounds than the
other protocols. The . proposed
protocol has larger ·number of hash
function than LSH and SCH
protocols. However, LSH and SCH
protocols have larger number of
public and secret key encrypti on
than
the
proposed
protocol.
Therefore, the proposed protocol
has light total computation cost.
This implies that our protocol is
efficient and particularly suitable

the

protocol

but

also

ha s

considerably lower computational
cost. In sum, this paper proposes

more efficient and secure protocol.

environm ents, such as -networks for
mobile
and
wireless
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